Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, distinguished members, yesterday

Saddam met members of the Atomic Energy Organization addressing

then as what he calls mujaheddin. That is people who exert extreme

effort and may sacrifice themselves for their work. And this

is what he had to say yesterday. ‘‘The Americans and British say

that if Iraq is left to its own means, it might make such and such

weapons.’’ He didn’t name them, but it’s clear what he meant.

‘‘They mean to harm us.’’ ‘‘It is to prevent any Arab or Muslim from

progress.’’ He calls it progress. ‘‘This is the evil program of the

West, and especially the Americans assisted by Zionism and their

supporters.’’ It is clear now, at this critical juncture, that at his

meeting with Atomic Energy exhorting them to do their ‘‘national

duty’’—we see Saddam back at his own old games of trying to create

at least the impression that he is a dangerous man and a menace

and should not be trifled with.

The last meetings of the Iraqi delegation with the U.N.-relevant

personnel on resuming inspections in Iraq, the Iraqi Government

decided, after they failed to make the U.N. agree to their terms of

getting the inspectors back, they wanted some concessions. They

declared that the inspector’s job is to disarm Iraq and leave it defenseless

against American strikes since the Americans will never

remove sanctions. So the whole game they thought the inspectors

are charged with is to disarm Iraq. Since the inspectors are

charged only with dismantling weapons of mass destruction and

their facilities, this was an admission that Iraq may possess these

weapons and also an implied threat that, facing an invasion, it

might use them.

If we go back to the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, Iraq built

its own weapons of mass destruction in technologies indigenously

with some foreign help. It understood that its main assets were not

the equipment but the scientists and engineers that makes these

weapons. Thus Saddam’s government kept a tight lid on its science

and engineering military teams at the same time it allowed

UNSCOM and IAEA to demolish some of its weapon production

sites.

That these science and engineering teams were capable of rebuilding

the program was made manifestly clear in the aftermath

of the gulf war. Within less than a year, these teams rebuilt successfully

most of Iraq’s services infrastructure. This included rebuilding

power stations, major telephone exchanges, and oil refineries.

Elated by their success, Saddam kept these teams as contracting

entities to the government for the civilian sector with a much-reduced

load and assigned them the rebuilding of the needed facilities

for the nuclear and other weapons-of-mass-destruction programs.

This provided them with a cover as civilian contractors with

the actual work to prove it. But, at the same time, their weaponsof-

mass-destruction work continued unhindered.

Thus, the computer we used for the nuclear-weapon design is

now located in a hospital in Saddam City at the outskirts of Baghdad.

If an inspector should arrive at the site, he or she will be

shown contracts for the civilian sector. The only indication that

things are not what they seem is that it is headed by a man who

worked extensively on the Iraqi nuclear-weapon design and that

most of his staff are former workers in the nuclear weapon program.

Legally, and according to the current mandate of UNMOVIC, the

U.N. inspection body, the burden is on the inspectors to prove otherwise.

Thus, Saddam has managed, from the experience of the last

11 years, to create the perfect cover. In effect, it turned the whole

Iraq science and engineering enterprise into a giant weapon-making

body. And since they do actually accomplish civilian tasks, the

economic burden on the government is also reduced.

Saddam valued his people more than equipment. And while he

initially allowed the U.N. teams to destroy some of his equipment

and facilities, Saddam kept tight control over his scientists and engineers.

Thus defections were kept to a minimum. This was helped

by well-publicized cases of defectors seeking help and were turned

down. One of them got killed in Jordan by Iraqi agents while waiting

for the U.S. Embassy to grant him an entry visa. Not a single

high-level defector left the regime since the botched defection of

Hussein Kamel, Saddam’s son-in-law, to Jordan in 1995. This kept

the information flow out of Iraq to a minimum, increasing the opacity

of the WMD programs.

Iraq is well into CW production and may well be in the process

of BW production. With more than 10 tons of uranium and 1 ton

of slightly enriched uranium, according to German intelligence, it

has in its possession, Iraq has enough to generate the needed

bomb-grade uranium for three nuclear weapons by 2005.

Iraq has corporations in India and other countries to import the

needed equipment for its programs, then channel them through

countries like Malaysia for shipment to Iraq. Germany already

blacklisted some of these companies for violating sanctions imposed

on Iraq.

Iraq is importing directional-control instruments for its missiles

of much higher precision than those needed for the allowed 160 kil-

ometer missiles under U.N. sanctions. Thus, Iraq is gearing to extend

the range of its missiles to easily reach Israel.

The type of equipment imported indicate that Iraq is in the process

of creating its own foundation for the production of needed materials,

thus avoiding detection if these materials are on the watch

list of exporting countries. Following this logic, Iraq is or will be

able to produce its own growth media for the biological weapons

program and many of the precursors for chemical weapon program.

The same can be said for local uranium production from

phosphates. This removes many limitations on production and allows

Iraq to accelerate its own weapons programs.

The inspection regime in Iraq had a mixed history. The International

Atomic Energy Agency, the body charged with ensuring

that nuclear facilities are not used for nuclear-weapons purposes,

failed in its task with regards to Iraq before the gulf war. The

International Atomic Energy Agency remains basically a weak organization

beset by its international composition and multiple loyalties

of its workers though within its sphere it has been quite successful

in accounting for and keeping a tab on essential components

of the nuclear fuel cycle, but it has limited leverage with the states

and works best in a cooperative and amiable environment.

Against determined states such as Iraq, it is at a great disadvantage,

thus it failed again after the gulf war when it declared early

that it took care of basically all of Iraq’s nuclear program. It took

the defection of Kamel, Saddam’s son-in-law, to force the Iraqi Government

to declare the actual scope of its nuclear weapons program

and forced the inspectors to start all over again in revealing what

has not been declared before.

We are talking about a two-stage process—dismantling what is

there and monitoring after—so that it does not get rebuilt. With

Iraq’s aggressive behavior toward inspectors and the cat-and-mouse

game it continuously plays with them, monitoring becomes problematic

at best in the later stage of keeping Iraq disarmed. So even

if some equipment are dismantled, getting them not to be rebuilt

again will be problematic in any future program. Iraq could just at

any time stop cooperating and it might be just too late to stop it

from continuing its weapons program.

If the inspectors go back now, there is very little human intelligence

that will help them locate the new weaponsites. Spread

widely among the government infrastructure in smaller hard-to-detect

units, the inspectors will have a hard time locating all the program’s

components. A recent defector with credible information asserted

that all units are built with a backup. If one is detected or

is in danger of discovery, all activity is immediately transferred to

the backup facility.

The new UNMOVIC inspection body do not have the support and

free hand UNSCOM enjoyed. With Russia and other states that

favor removing sanctions, keeping the pressure, the onus now is on

the inspectors to prove that Iraq is in violation. Not finding a

smoking gun after a series of inspections is all that the Russians

and the French need to declare that the United States has no case

and sanctions must be lifted. The U.S. case will be considerably

weakened, and more voices will rise against U.S.-Iraqi policy as

baseless if the inspectors go in and find no smoking gun that Iraq

is making weapons of mass destruction. This is a danger that must

be carefully examined before inspection teams are allowed back in

Iraq possibly to divert an invasion.

Many voices declared that Iraq was not pursuing nuclear weapons

before the gulf war. This included the IAEA, International

Atomic Energy Agency, that declared Iraq clean in many statements.

This happened even after the German publication, Der

Spiegel, reported Iraq’s successful attempt to acquire classified uranium

centrifuge enrichment technology from Germany.

However, the United States knew better and used the gulf war

setting as a way to dismantle Iraq’s nuclear weapons program. But

its dismantling process ignored the knowledge base acquired over

the years that can be used easily to rebuild what was destroyed.

A similar insistence on proof before taking serious action will be allowing

Saddam to achieve his goals and challenge the U.S. interests

again.

With no large, easily distinguishable nuclear sites, and little or

no human intelligence, it is difficult to see how any measure, short

of a regime change, will be effective. Saddam is totally indifferent

to the human suffering of his people. And with his threats of reprisals

against the families of weapons-of-mass-destruction workers

has managed to stop defections among his personnel despite the

fact that a large number of Iraqis from other walks of life managed

to escape. With a Soviet-style economy that’s basically geared to

war and its requirements, Iraq is currently the only Arab state

that all Arab extremists look at as the future challenger to Israel

and U.S. interests in the region. Thus, if Saddam makes it in the

nuclear arena, he will be the region’s undisputed leader in Arab

eyes. It will then be much harder to agree on the needed concessions

for a peace process, and a viable peace will be impossible to

achieve under any terms.

Saddam has used and will continue to use the Palestine issue to

rally the Arabs around him as he did when he used the Arab leaders

meeting in Baghdad to challenge the peace treaty of Egypt with

Israel that President Sadat agreed to.

Saddam and terrorism: Saddam Hussein has a long history of involvement

in international terrorism, from assassinations of Iraqis

abroad in the 1970s and 1980s to support for radical anti-Western

groups in the 1980s and 1990s to links with Islamic fundamentalists

today. His track record speaks for itself.

Always the opportunist, he has used the biannual Islamic conferences

held in Baghdad since the 1980s as a recruiting ground for

Islamic radicals from around the Muslim world. A former Iraqi intelligence

officer now in Europe has described how he would dress

as a cleric and approach Islamists from key countries to put on the

Iraqi payroll for special operations. He was tasked—that is, the intelligence

officer—to recruit Pakistanis, Indonesians, and Malaysians,

while other officers concentrated on Palestinians and Arabs.

We know from credible sources that Osama bin Laden was a frequent

visitor to the Iraqi Embassy in Khartoum when bin Laden

was a resident of the Sudanese capital until 1996. It is no coincidence

that Khartoum is one of Iraq intelligence service’s largest

foreign station.

It has also been confirmed that the Iraqi Ambassador in Turkey,

Farouk Hijazi, traveled to Afghanistan and met bin Laden in December

1998. It is revealing to note that prior to being appointed

Ambassador to Ankara, Hijazi was head of foreign operations for

Iraqi Intelligence Service. Incidentally, the same Hijazi who was

hurriedly pulled out of Ankara on September 29, 2001, has recently

resurfaced as Iraq’s Ambassador to Tunisia.

There have been several confirmed sightings of Islamic fundamentalists

from Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Gulf states being

trained in terror tactics at the Iraq intelligence camp at Salman

Park, 20 miles south of Baghdad on the Tigris River. Three intelligence

officers have reported that they were surprised to find non-

Iraqi fundamentalists undergoing training at the facility. The

training involved assassination, explosions, and hijacking. All three

reported that there is a fuselage of an old Tupolev 154 airliner

used for hijack training. This was later confirmed by satellite photographs.

Iraq military capability has been considerably depleted since the

gulf war. Part of the drive to rebuild larger weapon-of-mass-destruction

stockpiles is to make up for this depletion in military capability.

Iraq, now, has practically no air force, a much degraded

air-defense system, and practically no new tanks, heavy artillery,

or armored vehicle. What is left functioning from the gulf war arsenal

is basically in the hands of the Special Republican Guard, and

the rest of the Armed Forces are basically armed with light weaponry.

With a highly corrupt officer corps, the Iraq Army suffers from

a large number of absenteeism, poor or nonexistent medical care,

pilfered rations and little or no pay.

It is estimated that Iraq has no more than a quarter of the fire

power it possessed at the onset of the gulf war. With the original

Ba’ath Party members mostly murdered or jailed, Saddam’s government

now is purely a personal dictatorship of Saddam and his

clans. The original rhetoric of the Ba’ath party no longer carry any

weight with the population.

Iraqi WMD are under the control of the special security organization.

This is the same group that is charged with Saddam’s security.

This feared and ruthless organization is mainly composed of

conscripts from Saddam’s hometown and very loyal tribes in the

adjacent areas. They have an observer in all major military meetings,

and they are present at the headquarters of all the division

commanders, and they report directly to Saddam’s younger son, Qussey.

Any operation to disrupt the authority of the central government

of Iraq or the Iraqi command structure and especially the handling

of deployment of weapons of mass destruction must target this organization.

Precision bombing and strict enforcement of no-drive

zones should eliminate most, if not all, of the dangers of Saddam

possibly using his CBW against U.S. forces. Past defections from

this pampered group indicate that it is not as tightly controlled as

was earlier thought, and defection rate may increase considerably

when faced with an imminent invasions.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator, the weakest link was research—that is, research

that could resolve the bottlenecks in the program. For example,

with uranium enrichment which one needs at the bomb core—

you need some bomb-grade uranium, so you need to enrich natural

uranium using enrichment processes—we were held for 5 years because

we could not develop an enrichment barrier that will separate

the heavy from the light uranium. So the bottlenecks in technology

were the hold up.

The same goes for the calutron process to enrich uranium using

the electromagnetic method. We were held up by simple technologies

here, but these were insurmountable problems to us over

there.

They declared they did. In 1993, Iraq surmounted

the bottleneck in the diffusion barrier technology and declared it in

its full, final, and complete declaration. So Iraq did declare that

some of these bottlenecks—for example, in the diffusion process—

were resolved. But still it leaves a very small core of researchers

to be the really critical part of the program. And if these small

cores of researchers—that’s what I mention in the book—were

taken care of, the program will be probably hindered.

We had two experiences—when I was transferred to

the military industry to start the nuclear weapon program, the enrichment

group was ordered by Kamel to use the Germans. Our

original intent was that using foreigners is a leaky process. We always—

information leaks out by foreigners. Using the Germans, for

example, in 1989, Der Spiegel published a detailed report on what

the Germans gave us and what kind of expertise we got. So that

was a sobering experience. And I believe after that Iraq will use

scientists in a very limited way.

I believe some scientists were used in rejuvenating the chemical

weapon program, but not many in the nuclear. I believe Iraq still

relies on its own scientists to develop its own weapons program.

This is the German assessment I mentioned. As I

mention in the report, I took parts of these statements to save

time, but this is the German BND assessment based on what it observed

from Iraqi defectors and Iraqi capabilities.

It was made last year, and there are reports that

they repeated it this year again. It was February of 2001.

I agree with Ambassador Butler. Containment did

keep Iraq from accelerating its production, limited what is available

to it, destroyed most of its weapon repository. But in the end,

it’s not the answer for the simple reason Iraq restructured its

science and technology base around the containment policy, so it

created a new international network for purchasing, redistributed

its scientists and engineers so that they will not be very visible to

air strikes and to possible inspectors if they go in. So, in the end,

Iraq is working to defeat containment. And, in the end, it will

achieve its purpose.

So containment did delay—yes, I agree with the Ambassador—

considerably Iraq’s—Iraq would have been now in possession of nuclear

weapons without containment and a much larger stockpile of

chemical and possibly much more biological weapons. But in the

end, we need something else with containment. My suggestion, as

I stated earlier, is that regime change as the stated U.S. policy

would be the correct way to deal with this problem.

Surely what we are talking about here really is a

preemptive strike for a possible future danger which is much larger

than what we have right now. And it would be much costlier in the

future, or not? Yes. If we do it much later, it will be a much costlier

strike than what we do now.

What I believe is it is much easier now at much less

cost and less danger to the United States to do it right than to do

it after the window closes.

Is that to me?

I believe the experience of an attack from outside

that caused an uprising was there in the gulf war, and it gave us

an example of what could happen. I believe the circumstances are

even better right now for an uprising than was the gulf war. I

mean, we had sanctions then of less than a year. And we had a

very strong uprising that took off Saddam government in more

than two-thirds of the country. What we have now is a country

that’s under sanctions for 11 years and under Saddam oppression

for all this period. The Iraqis are, by now, giving up hope of any

possible change unless they get rid of that man. And so I believe

if there is a serious U.S. intent to remove him, and there is an attack,

the Iraqis will join the U.S. forces, like what happened in Afghanistan.

And there will be an uprising, and there will be a great

support for any invasion from inside Iraq.

There are two stages, Senator, for the delivery system

to be successful. One is that the nuclear weapon itself has to

be hardened to withstand the missile trip itself, which can——

Exactly.

Iraq has not done that, until I left. Now I’m talking

about 8 years ago since I left. We had no, as I said, high-level defector

to tell us what is going on down there in any case. I expect

that’s a defined project and this work must be done. So Iraq needed

to do that at the time. I don’t know if it has been done. I don’t

think the inspectors found anything in that direction up to 1998.

They are in a better position to answer that. My impression, they

did not find any trace of serious Iraqi work in that direction.

Whether it happened since 1998 until now, my guess it would.

The second stage is mating that to a missile. The Iraqi missile

has a problem, that’s the payload gets much smaller with the increased

range, because what they are doing is not——

Yes.

Exactly.

Exactly.

Exactly correct.

And the problem with the Iraq missile system is that

Iraq did not develop a medium-range missile. It took short-range

missiles and extended the range, and that meant the payload will

be smaller eventually. So we had that problem. We faced it when

I was there. And that was one of the things that was under consideration.

I don’t know if Iraq resolved that either.

So the problem of delivery of a nuclear warhead by a missile remains

to be questionable by Iraq, so one has to look at other options

that Iraq could use to deliver its nuclear weapons. But my belief

right now, Iraq does not have this capability yet.

The whole idea that Saddam will use a nuclear

weapon and just attack I don’t think comes into play here. What

happens here is that nuclear weapons at least will be the deterrence

he needs to have a free hand in the region. That’s the fear,

not the fear that he will put nuclear weapons on a missile and

shoot it at Israel or the United States. We know what kind of response

he will get, and he knows it as well.

What will happen next is that if he gets the deterrence he needs

to have a free hand in the region, what shape of action do we need

to take against him, and what kind of situation would we be in in

the future? That’s the danger.

Yes. Apparently, the nuclear facilities themselves are

above ground mostly. But what happened is that now Iraq shifted—

according to one civil engineer who defected recently, shifted

into building smaller underground facilities. And to cover that,

they understood the satellite angle quite well, that if you dig underground,

this is a red flag and everybody will be watching. Every

satellite passing by will be making tapes of what they are doing.

So what happened is they started doing that under existing

bunkers and under bungalows, so they had a surface cover to do

it, according to that engineer. And they do it also in duplicate, so

that if one site is compromised, they can go back to the backup site.

So the policy has been changed, according to the defector, and

this is very credible report he is giving us, and it’s been verified here.

According to Richard Sperzel, who is the chief inspector

of the Iraq biological weapon program—I talked to him several

times—he is of the opinion that the type of anthrax, especially the

one that appeared in Senator Daschle’s letter addressed to him, is

a type that would have an Iraqi fingerprint on it and that the type

of powder used and the technology used in loading the anthrax

spores on the powder would indicate that Iraq is a possible source

of this type of anthrax. He was not convinced that it is a single individual

that did it, a loner somewhere. He thinks it is a joint effort,

a large effort, of an expert team with a lot of technology under his disposal.

So that would be just about the only indication so far that there

is a possible terrorism source from Iraq using its weapons of mass

destruction under its disposal.